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Abstract. Control systems are exposed to unintentional errors, deliberate in-
trusions, false data injection attacks, and various other disruptions. In this paper
we propose, justify, and illustrate a rule of thumb for detecting, or confirming
the absence of, such disruptions. To facilitate the use of the rule, we rigorously
discuss background results that delineate the boundaries of the rule’s applica-
bility. We also discuss ways to further widen the applicability of the proposed
intrusion-detection methodology.
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1 Introduction
Computer systems monitor and control a myriad of physical processes, and their protec-
tion against random errors, deliberate intrusions (e.g., Denning, 1987; Debar et al., 1999;
Ca´rdenas et al., 2011; Premathilaka et al., 2013; and references therein), false data injections
(e.g., Liang, 2017; and references therein), and other disruptors has become of much inter-
est. A number of sophisticated methods have been suggested in the literature for tackling
such problems, including probabilistic (e.g., Huang et al., 2016; Onoda, 2016), deep learning
(e.g., He et al., 2017), and artificial neural networks based methods (e.g., Potluri, 2017), to
name a few. The aim of the present paper is to describe, justify, and illustrate a simple-
to-formulate and quick-to-implement procedure for detecting intrusions in control systems.
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Transfer function h(x)
. . . , X1, . . . , Xn ∼ F . . . , Y 01 , . . . , Y 0n
Figure 1.1: A control system.
The procedure is a natural offspring of extensive probabilistic and statistical explorations
by Davydov and Zitikis (2007, 2017), Chen at al. (2018), and Gribkova and Zitikis (2018).
Details follow.
Suppose we are dealing with a control system, which intakes random variables X1, . . . , Xn
and outputs their transformations Y 01 , . . . , Y
0
n ; we use the superscript “0” to indicate that
the outputs have not been compromised. There is a transfer function h(x) associated with
this control system (Figure 1.1), and thus the outputs are of the form
Y 0i := h(Xi), i = 1, . . . , n. (1.1)
Assume that the inputs X1, . . . , Xn have been pre-whitened, and thus are independent and
identically distributed (iid) random variables, whose marginal cumulative distribution func-
tions (cdf’s) we denote by F (x).
Filters have pre-specified transfer windows, which are usually intervals (a, b] for some real
numbers a < b. Hence, the associated transfer function h(x) maps the interval (a, b] to the
set of real numbers. We assume that the cdf F (x) is supported by (a, b], that is, F (x) ∈ (0, 1)
for all x ∈ (a, b), with the boundary values F (a) = 0 and F (b) = 1. Furthermore, we assume
that the cdf F (x) is strictly increasing on (a, b], and thus generates data that can potentially
fill in every part of the transfer window. Even though the methodology developed in this
paper allows for various transfer functions, to facilitate clarity of the following arguments,
we work with functions h(x) that have continuous and bounded first derivatives.
The outputs Y 01 , . . . , Y
0
n may, however, be compromised by intrusion variables, which we
denote by ε1, . . . , εn ∼ Fε. We assume that they are iid random variables, independent of
the inputs X1, . . . , Xn, and have means µε = 0 and finite variances σ
2
ε < ∞. These are, of
course, the classical assumptions associated with errors in dynamical systems such as time
series (e.g., Tong, 1990; Box et al., 2015). That is, the actual outputs are realizations of the
random variables (Figure 1.2)
Yi := Y
0
i + εi, i = 1, . . . , n. (1.2)
To find out whether or not the system is being compromised is the same – in the context
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Transfer function h(x)
Are the intrusions ε1, . . . , εn ∼ Fε degenerate or not?
. . . , X1, . . . , Xn ∼ F . . . , Y1, . . . , Yn
Figure 1.2: The control system with a potential intrusion.
of the present paper – as testing whether or not the cdf Fε is non-degenerate (i.e., εi’s are
not equal to 0) or degenerate (i.e., εi’s are equal to 0). In the former case, we say that the
intrusion variables are present, and in the latter case, we say that they are absent. Hence,
in practical uses of the herein developed recommendations, the presence and the absence of
intrusion variables should be understood in the statistical sense.
Intuitively (e.g., Ca´rdenas et al., 2011, p. 360), in order to distinguish between the two
situations, the outputs Y 01 , . . . , Y
0
n under no intrusion should be in some reasonable order
so that incoming intrusion variables would disrupt the order and in this way make them
detectible. The following definition clarifies what we mean by “reasonable order” within the
context of the present research.
Definition 1.1. We say that the non-contaminated outcomes Y 0i = h(Xi), i = 1, . . . , n, are
in reasonable order when the random sequence B0n, n ≥ 1, defined by
B0n :=
1√
n
n∑
i=2
∣∣h(Xi:n)− h(Xi−1:n)∣∣ (1.3)
is asymptotically bounded in probability, that is, when B0n = OP(1) as n → ∞, where
X1:n ≤ · · · ≤ Xn:n are the ordered inputs X1, . . . , Xn. If, however, B0n = OP(1) does not
hold (e.g., when B0n
P→∞), then we call the outputs out of reasonable order.
To work out intuition on this definition, consider first the case when the outputs are very
chaotic in the sense that they are zigzagging up and down in a steady fashion when going
from one order statistic Xi−1:n to the next one Xi:n. Such outputs, obviously, are out of
reasonable order in the sense of the above definition.
If, on the other hand, the function h ◦ F−1(u) is smooth and well-behaving in the sense
that its derivative (d/du)h ◦ F−1(u) exists and is bounded on its domain of definition [0, 1],
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then the outputs are in reasonable order as the following computations show:
B0n =
1√
n
n∑
i=2
∣∣h(Xi:n)− h(Xi−1:n)∣∣
=
1√
n
n∑
i=2
∣∣h ◦ F−1(Ui:n)− h ◦ F−1(Ui−1:n)∣∣
=
1√
n
n∑
i=2
∣∣∣∣ ddth ◦ F−1(νi)(Ui:n − Ui−1:n)
∣∣∣∣
= OP(n
−1/2), (1.4)
where Ui:n, i = 1, . . . , n, are the order statistics of the uniform on [0, 1] random variables
Ui := F (Xi), i = 1, . . . , n, and νi is a random variable taking values between Ui−1:n and Ui:n.
Note that the assumed boundedness of the derivative (d/du)h ◦ F−1(u) results in the much
stronger asymptotic property B0n = OP(n
−1/2) than the required B0n = OP(1). This suggest
that the assumption can be relaxed, which is indeed possible as we shall soon see.
Note 1.1. In what follows, if a random sequence ξn is such that ξn = OP(1), then we simply
say that ξn is asymptotically bounded, without specifying “in probability.” If ξn
P→ c, then
we say that ξn converges to c. Finally, if ξn
P→∞, we say that ξn tends to infinity.
We have organized the rest of the paper as follows. In Section 2, we formulate, justify,
and illustrate a rule of thumb for detecting unintentional (e.g., measurement) errors as well
as deliberate intrusions (e.g., false data injections) in control systems. In Section 3, we
explore the rule when, due to a variety of reasons such as vulnerability testing, the system is
fed artificially-deigned deterministic inputs, instead of the usual random inputs X1, . . . , Xn.
Section 4 concludes the paper with a brief summary of main contributions.
2 A rule of thumb and its justification
The rule of thumb that we shall formulate in a moment relies on the asymptotic behaviour
of the quantities
In :=
1
Bn
√
n
n∑
i=2
(
Yi,n − Yi−1,n
)
+
and
Bn :=
1√
n
n∑
i=2
∣∣Yi,n − Yi−1,n∣∣
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when n→∞, where x+ = max{x, 0} for any x ∈ R, and Y1,n, . . . , Yn,n are the concomitants
(e.g., David and Nagaraja, 2003) that arise from the pairs (X1, Y1), . . . , (Xn, Yn).
Rule of Thumb
Case 1: In does not (decisively or vaguely) approach 1/2:
(i) If In decisively tends to a limit other than 1/2, then the decision maker
is to be advised about the absence of intrusion variables.
(ii) If In seems to tend to a limit other than 1/2 but there is some doubt
(due to, e.g., data uncertainty) as to whether this is indeed true, then
we check if Bn is asymptotically bounded, and if yes, then the decision
maker is to be advised about the absence of intrusion variables.
Case 2: In (decisively or vaguely) approaches 1/2:
(i) If Bn decisively grows to infinity when n→∞, then the decision maker
is to be advised about the presence of intrusion variables.
(ii) If Bn is definitely asymptotically bounded, then the decision maker is
to be advised about the absence of intrusion variables.
(iii) If there is some doubt as to whether Bn grows to infinity or is asymp-
totically bounded, then it should be checked whether or not the transfer
function h(x) takes the same value at the two endpoints of the trans-
fer window, that is, whether or nor the equation h(a) = h(b) holds (a
justification provided after Theorem 2.3 below):
• If the equation does not hold, then the decision maker is to be
advised about the presence of intrusion variables.
• If the equation holds, then the usual work of the control system
should be interrupted and deterministic inputs (details in Section 3
below) fed into the system for running the entire rule of thumb anew
from the very beginning.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the rule of thumb when the outputs are not compromised by intru-
sion variables. Clearly, In stays away from 1/2, thus giving a decisive confirmation about
the absence of intrusion variables (Case 1(i) of the rule of thumb). The sequence Bn is de-
clining and thus asymptotically bounded, which strengthens the conclusion even more (see
the second part of Case 1(ii) of the rule of thumb).
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Figure 2.1: In and Bn with respect to the sample size 1 ≤ n ≤ 300 when Xi ∼ Beta(α, β),
h(x) = 1− (x− 4/5)2 on [0, 1], and non-compromised outputs.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the rule of thumb when the outputs are compromised. Clearly, the
sequence In tends to 1/2, and it does so in a fairly rapid fashion (Case 2 of the rule). Next,
we check the behaviour of the sequence Bn, which is definitely growing, and we thus conclude
(Case 2(i) of the rule) that intrusion variables are present.
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Figure 2.2: In and Bn with respect to the sample size 1 ≤ n ≤ 300 when Xi ∼ Beta(α, β),
h(x) = 1 − (x − 4/5)2 on [0, 1], and compromised outputs with Gaussian intrusions εi ∼
N(0, σ2ε) with σ
2
ε = 0.01.
Of course, as is the case with all rules of thumb, they generally work, but there are
situations when they fail, due to the simple reason that they rely on theoretical results,
whose validity is usually based on certain assumptions. Hence, to rigorously sort out when
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the above rule of thumb works and when it does not, we next describe the results and
assumptions that give rise to the rule. We start with the note that by having assumed
the continuity of the cdf F , we have excluded (almost surely) all the ties among the inputs
X1, . . . , Xn, and thus given rise to the order statistics X1:n < · · · < Xn:n that uniquely
determine the corresponding concomitants Y1,n, . . . , Yn,n (e.g., David and Nagaraja, 2003).
Theorem 2.1. Let the non-compromised outcomes be in reasonable order, that is, let the
transfer function h(x) and the inputs X1, . . . , Xn satisfy Definition 1.1. If Bn is asymptoti-
cally bounded, then the cdf Fε is degenerate at 0.
Proof. We first provide additional information about the concomitants Y1,n, . . . , Yn,n un-
der the above specified model: the inputs X1, . . . , Xn ∼ F are iid, the intrusion variables
ε1, . . . , εn ∼ Fε are also iid, and the two sets of random variables are independent, that
is, the inputs and the intrusion variables are mutually independent. Under this model, the
concomitants admit the representation
Yi,n = h(Xi:n) + ε[i], i = 1, . . . , n,
where ε[i] denotes the particular intrusion variable associated with Xi:n. Equipped with these
facts, we write the bounds
Bn ≥ 1√
n
n∑
i=2
|ε[i] − ε[i−1]| − 1√
n
n∑
i=2
∣∣h(Xi:n)− h(Xi−1:n)∣∣
≥ 1√
n
n∑
i=2
(
|ε[i] − ε[i−1]| − E
[|ε[i] − ε[i−1]|])+ n− 1√
n
E
[|ε[i] − ε[i−1]|]+OP(1)
when n → ∞. It is known (e.g., David and Nagaraja, 2003, p. 145) that ε[1], . . . , ε[n] are
iid and follow the same cdf Fε as the original intrusion variables ε1, . . . , εn. Since we have
assumed that the latter ones have finite second moments, we therefore conclude that
Bn ≥
√
n E
[|ε[2] − ε[1]|]+OP(1)
=
√
n E
[|ε2 − ε1|]+OP(1)
when n→∞. Since we have assumed that the sequence Bn is asymptotically bounded when
n → ∞, the expectation E[|ε2 − ε1|] must be equal to 0. The latter can be true only if the
cdf Fε is degenerate at some point, which of course must be equal to 0 due to the assumed
zero means of the intrusion variables. This finishes the proof of Theorem 2.1.
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Hence, Theorem 2.1 says that if the sequence Bn is asymptotically bounded when n→∞,
then there are no intrusion variables, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. The following theorem
explains what happens when Bn is not asymptotically bounded, which is the case explored
in Figure 2.2.
Theorem 2.2 (Gribkova and Zitikis, 2018). Let the non-compromised outputs h(Xi) have
finite second moments, and let the intrusion variables ε1, . . . , εn, irrespective of whether they
are degenerate or not, also have finite second moments. If Bn grows to infinity when n→∞,
then In converges to 1/2.
Hence, Theorem 2.2 says that if Bn grows to infinity, then the control system is compro-
mised, provided that the limit 1/2 indicates the presence of intrusion variables, which indeed
happens most of the time, but not always, and this is the very point where the condition
h(a) 6= h(b) arises. The following theorem and discussion clarify the matter.
Theorem 2.3 (Gribkova and Zitikis, 2018). Let the derivative (d/du)h ◦ F−1(u) exist, be
continuous, and not identically equal to 0 on the interval [0, 1]. If the outputs are not com-
promised, that is, if the cdf Fε is degenerate (at the point 0), then In converges to
I(h) :=
∫ b
a
(h′(u))+du∫ b
a
|h(u)|du
.
Hence, when there are no intrusion variables, In converges to I(h), which can be equal
to 1/2. This can happen if and only if
∫ b
a
(h′(u))+du =
∫ b
a
(h′(u))−du, where we have used
the notation x− = max{−x, 0}. Since x = x+ − x−, the above equation is equivalent to∫ b
a
h′(u)du = 0, which means
h(a) = h(b). (2.1)
Consequently, by eliminating the possibility of having equation (2.1), we establish an one-to-
one relationship between the convergence of In to 1/2 and the presence of intrusion variables.
We note in this regard that, as far as we are aware of, practically relevant transfer functions
are outside the class of those satisfying the relationship h(a) = h(b), unless the control
system is down and the transfer function h(x) takes the same value irrespective of x ∈ [a, b].
To illustrate the case h(a) = h(b) visually, in Figure 2.3 we have depicted the asymptotic
behaviour of In and Bn with added intrusion variables ε1, . . . , εn. Clearly, In tends to 1/2,
and Bn grows. Based on the rule of thumb (see Case 2(i)), we conclude that the systems is
compromised by intrusion variables.
For comparison, in Figure 2.4 we depict asymptotic behaviour of In and Bn when the
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Figure 2.3: In and Bn with respect to the sample size 1 ≤ n ≤ 300 when Xi ∼
(8/5)Beta(α, β), h(x) = 1− (x− 4/5)2 on [0, 8/5], and compromised outputs with Gaussian
intrusions εi ∼ N(0, σ2ε) with σ2ε = 0.01.
outputs are not compromised. The asymptotic behaviour of In is erratic, though perhaps we
could still argue that there is some tendency to get closer to 1/2. Nevertheless, the sequence
Bn is clearly declining and thus asymptotically bounded, and we therefore decisively conclude
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Figure 2.4: In and Bn with respect to the sample size 1 ≤ n ≤ 300 when Xi ∼
(8/5)Beta(α, β), h(x) = 1− (x− 4/5)2 on [0, 8/5], and non-compromised outputs.
(Case 2(ii) of the rule of thumb) that the system is not compromised.
We finish the present section by recalling the earlier note (see below (1.4)) that the
boundedness of the derivative (d/du)h ◦ F−1(u) can be relaxed. This is indeed possible due
to another theorem of Gribkova and Zitikis (2018), which is more complex than Theorem 2.3
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and allows the derivative (d/du)h ◦ F−1(u) to grow at the two endpoints of its domain
of definition [0, 1]. Nevertheless, the simpler case covered by Theorem 2.3 is sufficiently
encompassing and quite attractive from the practical point of view.
3 Deterministic inputs and vulnerability testing
Whether the rule of thumb detects intrusions or not, we can still wish to double-check the
finding, as we did near the end of the previous section. Furthermore, there can even be
a necessity to test the control system’s vulnerability (e.g., Hug and Giampapa, 2012; and
references therein). In such cases, instead of the pre-whitened random inputs X1, . . . , Xn, it
is natural to feed into the system deterministic inputs, such as
xi,n = a+ (b− a) i− 1
n− 1 , i = 1, . . . , n, (3.1)
and then apply the rule of thumb.
As an illustration, we go back to Figures 2.3 and 2.4, which concern the case h(a) = h(b),
and reassess our findings using deterministic inputs (3.1) with a = 0 and b = 8/5. In
Figure 3.1, we present both compromised and non-compromised cases. In the compromised
case (the two top panels), the convergence of In to 1/2 is even faster than in Figure 2.3,
whereas the sequence Bn grows in a similar fashion as in Figure 2.3. Hence, using the
deterministic inputs, we reach the same conclusion as before (i.e., the presence of intrusion
variables) but in a much faster fashion.
In the non-contaminated case (the two bottom panels of Figure 3.1), In not just converges
to 1/2 but is actually equal to 1/2, which may give the impression about the presence of
intrusions due to h(a) = h(b). However, the declining and thus asymptotically bounded
sequence Bn removes all the doubts by correctly implying the absence of intrusions (Case
2(ii) of the rule of thumb). Hence, paying particular attention to the asymptotic behaviour
of Bn is indeed enlightening. As to In and related interpretations, we refer to Chen at
al. (2018), and Gribkova and Zitikis (2018).
In Section 2 we presented three theorems that had justified the rule of thumb when
inputs were random, but the theorems, naturally, did not cover the deterministic case. The
following three theorems, which mimic though are not identical to Theorems 2.1–2.3, show
that the rule of thumb works in the case of deterministic inputs as well.
Theorem 3.1. The deterministic inputs given by equation (3.1) produce outputs in rea-
sonable order, as per Definition 1.1, that is, B0n with xi,n instead of Xi:n is asymptotically
12
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Figure 3.1: In and Bn with respect to the sample size 1 ≤ n ≤ 300 when inputs are
deterministic (8/5)(i−1)/(n−1), i = 1, . . . , n, the transfer function is h(x) = 1−(x−4/5)2 on
[0, 8/5], and the outputs are, or are not, compromised by Gaussian intrusions εi ∼ N(0, σ2ε).
bounded. Hence, if the sequence Bn is also asymptotically bounded and the intrusion variables
are iid ε1, . . . , εn ∼ Fε with means zero, then the cdf Fε must be degenerate (at point 0).
Proof. Since the derivative h′(x) exists and is uniformly bounded on [a, b], we have
B0n =
1√
n
n∑
i=2
∣∣h(xi,n)− h(xi−1,n)∣∣
≤ c√
n
n∑
i=2
∣∣xi,n − xi−1,n∣∣
= OP(n
−1/2). (3.2)
Hence, just like in the proof of Theorem 2.1, we conclude that Bn ≥
√
n E
[|ε2−ε1|]+OP(1),
which in turn implies that the cdf Fε is degenerate.
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Reflecting upon the proof of Theorem 3.1, we actually need only B0n = OP(1) and can
thus relax the uniform boundedness of h′(x). For example, we can require the transfer
function h(x) to be γ-Ho¨lder continuous for some γ ≥ 1/2, which means that there is a
constant c <∞ such that |h(x)−h(y)| ≤ c|x−y|γ for all x, y ∈ [a, b]. As an illustration, the
transfer function h(x) with a uniformly on [a, b] bounded derivative corresponds to the case
γ = 1. For the sake of clarity, however, we continue working with h(x) whose derivative is
uniformly bounded, which is a practically attractive and justifiable assumption.
Theorem 3.2. Let the inputs be deterministic and given by equation (3.1), and let the
intrusion variables ε1, . . . , εn follow a non-degenerate cdf Fε. Then In converges to 1/2.
Proof. Given the facts noted in the first half of the proof of Theorem 2.1, and also using
bound (3.2), we have
Bn =
1√
n
n∑
i=2
|ε[i] − ε[i−1]|+O(1)
=
1√
n
n∑
i=2
(
|ε[i] − ε[i−1]| − E
[|ε[i] − ε[i−1]|])+ n− 1√
n
E
[|ε[i] − ε[i−1]|]+O(1)
=
√
n E
[|ε2 − ε1|]+OP(1).
Following analogous arguments, we prove that, when n→∞,
An :=
1√
n
n∑
i=2
(
Yi,n − Yi−1,n
)
+
=
√
n E
[
(ε2 − ε1)+
]
+OP(1).
Since In = An/Bn, we have
In =
E
[
(ε2 − ε1)+
]
+OP(n
−1/2)
E
[|ε2 − ε1|]+OP(n−1/2) P−→ E
[
(ε2 − ε1)+
]
E
[|ε2 − ε1|] (3.3)
when n→∞. The ratio on the right-hand side of statement (3.3) is equal to 1/2 because the
random variable ε2−ε1 is symmetric irrespective of the cdf Fε. This proves Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.3 (Chen et al., 2018). Let the inputs be deterministic and given by equation
(3.1). Furthermore, assume that the outputs are not compromised by intrusion variables,
that is, the cdf Fε is degenerate. If the derivative h
′(x) is γ-Ho¨lder continuous for some
γ > 0, then In converges to
I(h) :=
∫ b
a
(h′(u))+du∫ b
a
|h(u)|du
.
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Figure 3.2: In and Bn with respect to the sample size 1 ≤ n ≤ 300 when h(x) = 1−(x−4/5)2
on [0, 1], and compromised outputs with Gaussian intrusions εi ∼ N(0, σ2ε) with σ2ε = 0.01.
Hence, in view of Theorems 3.1–3.3, we conclude that if the control system is in reasonable
order as per Definition 1.1, then even when the inputs are deterministic, the rule of thumb can
distinguish between compromised and non-compromised outputs. To illustrate, in Figure 3.2
we depict the asymptotic behaviour of In and Bn in the case of random and deterministic
inputs, and when the outputs are being compromised by intrusions ε1, . . . , εn, which for
illustrative purposes are assumed to be iid Gaussian with the same strictly-positive variances.
The two types of inputs, though different in nature, are uniform in their respective ways:
in the random case, they give rise to the uniform on [0, 1] order statistics, whereas in the
deterministic case, the points (i − 1)/(n − 1), i = 1, . . . , n, split the interval [0, 1] into
perfectly equal subintervals of length 1/(n− 1). The asymptotic behaviours of In and Bn in
the two cases are more or less identical, unlike what we shall see next, when the system is
not compromised.
Figure 3.3 is based on the same numerical example but without intrusion variables added
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Figure 3.3: In and Bn with respect to the sample size 1 ≤ n ≤ 300 when h(x) = 1−(x−4/5)2
on [0, 8/5], and non-compromised outputs.
to the outputs. Using the rule of thumb we confidently conclude that the system is not
compromised. Indeed, the sequence In rapidly converges to a limit different from 1/2, and
Bn is clearly asymptotically bounded. It is interesting to compare the cases of randomly
(the two top panels of Figure 3.3) and deterministically (the two bottom panels) uniform
inputs. In particular, using even very small sample sizes, the deterministic case allows us to
very quickly conclude the absence of intrusion variables in the control system.
4 Concluding notes
We have proposed, justified, and numerically illustrated a rule of thumb for deciding whether
or not a control system is being comprised. The rule is easy to implement, and we have
discussed its performance under scenarios with random and deterministic inputs. The latter
ones are particularly useful for speedy system’s performance and vulnerability checks. The
16
rule of thumb has been supported by rigorous theoretical considerations, which not only
make up a solid foundation for the rule but also gives rise to the possibility for extending its
use beyond what we have described in the present paper.
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